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Abstract
Collaborative environments, such as Wikipedia, often have low barriers-to-entry in order to encourage
participation. This accessibility is frequently abused (e.g., vandalism and spam). However, certain
inappropriate behaviors are more threatening than others. In this work, we study contributions which are not
simply ``undone'' -- but *deleted* from revision histories and public view. Such treatment is generally
reserved for edits which: (1) present a legal liability to the host (e.g., copyright issues, defamation), or (2)
present privacy threats to individuals (i.e., contact information).
Herein, we analyze one year of Wikipedia's public deletion log and use brute-force strategies to learn about
privately handled redactions. This permits insight about the prevalence of deletion, the reasons that induce it,
and the extent of end-user exposure to dangerous content. While Wikipedia's approach is generally quite
reactive, we find that copyright issues prove most problematic of those behaviors studied.
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ABSTRACT
Collaborative environments, such as Wikipedia, often have
low barriers-to-entry in order to encourage participation.
This accessibility is frequently abused (e.g., vandalism and
spam). However, certain inappropriate behaviors are more
threatening than others. In this work, we study contribu-
tions which are not simply “undone”– but deleted from revi-
sion histories and public view. Such treatment is generally
reserved for edits which: (1) present a legal liability to the
host (e.g., copyright issues, defamation), or (2) present pri-
vacy threats to individuals (i.e., contact information).
Herein, we analyze one year of Wikipedia’s public deletion
log and use brute-force strategies to learn about privately
handled redactions. This permits insight about the preva-
lence of deletion, the reasons that induce it, and the extent of
end-user exposure to dangerous content. While Wikipedia’s
approach is generally quite reactive, we find that copyright
issues prove most problematic of those behaviors studied.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.5.3 [Group and Organization Interfaces]: collabora-
tive computing, computer-supported cooperative work ;
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection
Keywords
Wikipedia, user generated content, collaboration, redaction,
content removal, copyright, information security.
1. INTRODUCTION
User-generated content (UGC) and collaborative function-
ality is becoming increasingly prevalent in Web applications.
The open-access models used in such systems enable the ac-
cumulation of content/knowledge at rates not possible in
more traditional settings. For example, the video-sharing
site YouTube has over 65,000 daily uploads [10], while the
collaborative encyclopedia Wikipedia [3] had 45 million edits
∗This work supported in part by ONR MURI N00014-07-1-0907.
in the past year [4]. Inevitably, such services publish some
inappropriate content: low barriers-to-entry invite poor con-
tributions, while massive volume prevents thorough vetting.
Indeed, it has been estimated that 7% of Wikipedia edits
are unconstructive in nature (i.e., vandalism) [15].
While abusive contributions may slowly erode the repu-
tation of a service, this research concerns itself with only
the most severe cases: content which is actually dangerous
to the host-site or real-world individuals. Wikipedia, our
basis for analysis, is no stranger to such threats. The en-
cyclopedia has been threatened with litigation for copyright
issues [14], accused of hosting child pornography [18], and
briefly blacklisted in some regions for similar reasons [11].
In an attempt to mitigate these threats, Wikipedia deletes
offending revisions from public view. We analyze one year’s
worth of public deletion logs to reason about the quantity
and reasoning behind such actions. Moreover, by archiving
Wikipedia revisions, we are able to recover deleted content
and discover redactions handled in a more private fashion.
We find deletion is not uncommon, with some 55,000 edits
being redacted/suppressed in 2010. However, the tool was
broadly enabled only recently, and thus is being used to han-
dle a backlog of old incidents. While this skews broad trends,
focus on recent events reveals a rather reactive system. Most
incidents are “undone” within minutes and deleted within
several hours. Copyright issues, however, prove harder to
identify. Strategies to detect such cases and address the con-
sequences of a declining Wikipedia labor force [13] remain
future challenges in this domain.
2. RELATED WORK
Given the short time for which revision deletion has been
enabled on English Wikipedia (see Sec. 3), our work is the
first to examine the process. Nonetheless, these are issues
which other UGC applications have confronted. Whereas
Wikipedia relies on a volunteer labor-force to find danger-
ous content, commercially-driven sites often outsource the
review process [16]. In their analysis of YouTube, Cha et al.
found that 0.4% of videos are deleted, but only 5% of these
are due to copyright violations. In contrast, our analysis
concentrates on text, not multimedia content (per Sec. 4.2).
More specific to Wikipedia is the work of Gehres et al. [12]
which proposes a multi-level security wiki. Gehres’ system is
proactive in delegating roles/rights, while Wikipedia’s dele-
tion system limits read-access in an ex post facto manner.
Meanwhile, Edwards [11] examines deletion/censorship on
UGC websites, finding it a practical requirement to avoid
blacklisting and regulatory troubles. Our motivation to pur-
sue this topic was [17] and the notion that deletion could
hide security events from public/researcher view.
ID DESCRIPTION
RD1 Blatant copyright violations
RD2 Grossly insulting/offensive
RD3 Purely disruptive material
RD4 Revision pending suppression
RD5 Other valid deletion
RD6 Non-contentious housekeeping
Table 1: Redaction criteria [8] Figure 1: Page history w/redaction
CHANGES # %
Visibility increased 563 69%
Visibility decreased 188 23%
No visibility changes 40 5%
Orthogonal changes 25 3%
TOTAL 816 100%
Table 2: Visibility changes
3. DELETION ON WIKIPEDIA
Revision deletion (sometimes called selective deletion or
redaction) on Wikipedia is enabled by a software feature
called RevDelete [8]. Revision deletion removes individual
edits from an article’s history and is a distinct mechanism
from standard deletion where whole entities are removed
(articles, files, etc.). Standard deletions happen for both
benign (e.g., non-notable article topics) and malignant rea-
sons (e.g., pornography). However, for reasons described in
Sec. 4.2, this work concentrates solely on revision deletions.
RevDelete was enabled for the ≈ 40 users with the over-
sight right in Jan. 2009. In May 2010, usage was extended
to the ≈ 1800 users with admin privileges1.
For each revision being handled, any combination of three
fields can be redacted: (1) the content, those modifications
made to the article (often visualized as a diff), (2) the
username of the editor who made the change, and/or (3) the
summary where the editor describes his/her modifications.
Fig. 1 shows an example page history with a redacted edit.
The acceptable “criteria for redaction”are shown in Tab. 1
and covered in greater depth at [8]. It should be noted that
“typical” vandalism and attacks do not merit deletion. Gen-
erally, one of these criteria is cited in the publicly-viewable
deletion log. Users with admin/oversight rights can audit
the actions of others, as they can see the deleted fields.
RevDelete also enables a stronger form of deletion called
suppression or oversight2. It is identical to the weaker form
except that: (1) it can only be performed by oversight
users, (2) affected edits can only be viewed by oversight
users, and (3) it is not publicly logged. Reasons for employ-
ing suppression are described at [7] and pertain primarily to
defamation and privacy issues.
4. DATA COLLECTION
4.1 Public Logs
The public deletion log is accessible via the MediaWiki
API [1]. Fields of interest include: (1) the revision-id (RID)
of the affected edit, (2) a log-id, (3) log timestamp, (4) a
comment field to explain the deletion, (5) a bit-field describ-
ing“old”visibility settings, and (6) a bit-field for new visibil-
ity settings. Similarly, the API can be used to gain informa-
tion about affected revisions (those portions not redacted).
We processed this log from Jan. 2010 through Jan. 2011,
storing information about roughly 50,000 redaction actions.
Occasionally, the visibility of a single edit’s fields are changed
multiple times in the twelve-month history. As Tab. 2 shows,
RevDelete users tend to show a conservative bias, initially
1If an “ordinary” user discovers dangerous content, permis-
sioned users can be notified using off-wiki channels.
2To avoid ambiguity, we treat the two forms in a disjoint
fashion. The terms deletion and redaction will refer exclu-
sively to the weaker (but more common) form, while sup-
pression will describe stronger uses of the tool.
censoring more fields then eventually deemed necessary. We
remove “preliminary” actions from our dataset, considering
only “final” assignments. Further, rows where the final state
is complete visibility (i.e.,“undeleted”) are discarded. These
two changes leave 49,161 unique revisions/rows for analysis.
4.2 Archiving Content
The public deletion log provides no data on two relevant
fronts: (1) the actual content redacted, and (2) usage of
the suppression function. However, by fully archiving all
Wikipedia revisions immediately after they are committed,
we can learn more about both aspects. If one has archived
data for a RID which later appears in a deletion log, then one
has its redacted fields. Similarly, if one has archived data for
a RID, but a subsequent request indicates redaction, then
the RID has been suppressed (if there is no public log entry).
The wholesale collection of Wikipedia data presents eth-
ical and legal issues. For example, one could acquire child-
pornography – the possession of which is illegal. This mo-
tivates our decision to archive only text content. Of course,
text content may also have legal implications (a motivating
factor of this research). Our institution’s legal counsel has
advised that our research is protected because it is a con-
sumer of such content, not a distributor thereof. This work
reproduces no deleted/suppressed content.
To archive content, we used a combination of “Recent
Changes” IRC channels and the Wikipedia API [1]. For
each edit to the main article namespace we store the RID
and the three fields eligible for reaction (content, username,
and summary). This was done for Aug. 2010, archiving ap-
proximately 4 million edits3. To find suppressed edits, we
re-queried the API for all RIDs in our archive several months
later, noting those revisions with redacted fields.
5. DATA ANALYSIS
5.1 Incident Groupings
In the previous section, we identified 49,161 revisions af-
fected by redaction. However, “revision-level” analysis is not
ideal. Imagine revision rn introduces dangerous content.
Subsequent revisions rn+1 . . . rn+x may be constructive, but
fail to remove the threat. When the dangerous content is
discovered, all edits back to rn will need to be redacted, be-
cause the threat persists through them. Thus, rn+1 onward
are essentially “collateral damage” of the earlier offense and
underscore why “incident-level” analysis is more intuitive.
Where possible, we present incident-based statistics.
In our data, incidents are identified when multiple RIDs
share a log-id (as well as log timestamp/comment) and are
therefore the result of a single RevDelete action. For our
3Additional data collection was forgone given the significant
bandwidth costs to both our own servers and those operated
by Wikipedia. Further, we seek only a glimpse into this
“private” data given our more complete public sets.
MO RD1 RD2 RD3 RD4+ OTH SUM
Jan. 2 11 0 1 9 23
Feb. 3 23 10 2 4 42
Mar. 25 31 3 1 27 87
Apr. 1 17 5 0 18 41
May 17 697 1006 2 97 1819
Jun. 37 913 427 37 101 1515
Jul. 88 718 1695 6 158 2665
Aug. 167 840 103 51 313 1474
Sep. 129 1846 161 18 193 2347
Oct. 252 5067 179 19 165 5682
Nov. 1087 535 112 14 215 1963
Dec. 338 323 152 84 352 1249
SUM 2146 11021 3853 235 1652 18907
Table 3: Deletion incidents (month × rationale)
49k revisions we identify 18,907 incidents. While 89% of
incidents have just one revision, copyright-related incidents
(identified per Sec. 5.4) have an average of 12.5 revisions.
This is intuitive: copyright incidents are less obvious than
other violations and are thus more likely to go unnoticed.
5.2 Redaction Prevalence
The “sum” column of Tab. 3 shows the quantity of in-
cidents flagged per month. Clearly, the decision to enable
RevDelete for admins (a 50× increase in the user-base) in
May 2010 had a profound effect. It would appear these ad-
ditional users benefit Wikipedia’s well-being.
Pinpointing the prevalence of dangerous revisions among
the complete set of edits is difficult. Roughly 45 million ed-
its were made to English Wikipedia in 2010 [4], and that
same year saw ≈ 19k incidents redacted. It should be em-
phasized that only 7,978 (42%) of the incidents flagged in
2010 actually occurred in that year. It remains to be seen
if this is a side-effect of the tools infancy (with a backlog
of incidents being cleared4, now that a mechanism exists to
redact them) or if some dangerous content is successful in
evading detection for such durations (see Sec. 5.5).
Of course, these figures represent only dangerous content
that is caught. It is difficult to quantify threats that are:
(1) live on the site, or (2) still accessible in page histories.
Available data does allow us to state that at least 0.05% of
revisions made in 2010 contained dangerous content. While
not overwhelming – a single incident could amount to legal
action (or a privacy leak) under the right circumstances.
5.3 Fields Affected
Tab. 4 shows the frequency of redaction for each of the
three eligible fields. In brief, content is deleted in 75% of in-
cidents and the summary in 25% of cases. Username redac-
tions are quite rare5. These results are unsurprising: article
content is the foundation of Wikipedia and thus also the
field most often in need of deletion.
5.4 Reasons for Redaction
Recall from Tab. 1 the six criteria for redaction. Tab. 3
shows the prevalence of each reason when grouped by inci-
dent. Mapping an incident to its criteria is straightforward,
given that RevDelete users conventionally cite reasons in
their block-log comments (which we assume trustworthy).
Vague/generalized criteria descriptions [8] and standard-
ized log entries, however, do not intuitively tell of the de
4A log of long-term abuse to Wikipedia is maintained at [5].
5Proactive patrolling of the “user creation log” may locate
offensive usernames before they can edit.
REDACTED NUM %
content 13616 72.0%
summary 4082 21.6%
user 832 0.8%
summary + content 151 4.4%
user + content 51 0.3%
user + summary 14 0.1%
all fields 161 0.8%
TOTAL 18907 100.0%
Table 4: Redacted fields for incidents
facto thresholds for redaction. By examining deleted content
(per our archival), we attempt to provide informal insight.
Our inspection found offensive content (RD2) revisions
were almost all directed at an explicit human individual.
Unsourced claims about these persons commonly involved
sexual innuendo, claims of promiscuity or pedophilia, and
racial slurs – usually carried out in profane language. Acts
of disruption (RD3) were found to be remarkably similar,
also including more “appropriately written” falsities, solici-
tations, and massive insertions of random content.
Copyright violations (RD1) are common6, yet straightfor-
ward. Such cases are not harmful on the surface, but in their
method of content acquisition. Criteria RD4, RD5, and RD6
are rarely cited and given no further attention7. The “OTH”
(other) column of Tab. 3 aggregates log-comments not citing
a particular issue. In general, this set contains a diverse set
of the previous criteria (see also footnote 7).
5.5 Redaction Response Times
One way to measure the impact of dangerous content is
the detection interval, the time duration between an inci-
dent’s beginning and eventual redaction. Fig. 2 visualizes
these intervals, indicating a median detection period of over
13,000 hours – or about 1.5 years. Clearly, as discussed in
Sec. 5.2, this speaks to the handling of a backlog of threats
prior to the time RevDelete was broadly enabled. Looking
only at incidents occurring after May 2010, results are more
encouraging. Analysis shows a median interval of 2 hours
for all incidents, yet 21.6 days for copyright-specific ones.
However, this does not indicate if fresh “old” incidents are
still being discovered. To this end, Fig. 3 shows detection
intervals based on the month of flagging. We would expect
to see any “backlog” being handled just after RevDelete was
widely enabled (May) and detection times improving with
continued usage. Results for [Nov. – Dec.] are a vast im-
provement over the Fig. 2 average, but [Sep. – Oct.] showed
the slowest detections of any interval studied. Future anal-
ysis is needed to determine the convergence of this trend.
In addition to the detection interval, we can measure a
critical subset of that period, an incident’s active duration.
The former is the time redacted edits are accessible via revi-
sion histories. The latter is the period when the damage was
in a default-visible version (i.e., that most-recent). All users
can make an edit inactive by simply editing the article. Im-
pressively, Fig. 4 reveals a median active duration of about
two minutes for all incidents, but 21 days for copyright in-
fringements (nearly identical to their detection interval).
6Tab. 3 may underestimate RD1 prevalence. In a Sep. 2010
incident, 25,000 suspected copyright infringements were
found [6], but the matter was not resolved using RevDelete.
7In fact, no incidents cite RD4 (revision pending over-
sight/suppression). Such labeling is likely avoided, as it
would invite attention to edits that admins should not view.
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MO #SP #RD MO #SP #RD
Jan. 536 40 Jul. 658 4134
Feb. 770 78 Aug. 287 4739
Mar. 445 144 Sep. 338 6077
Apr. 356 76 Oct. 557 9946
May 446 2803 Nov. 492 13509
Jun. 221 3137 Dec. 487 5790
SUM 5593 50473
Table 5: Num. suppressions (SP) & redactions (RD)
5.6 End-user Exposure
Combining the survival times of the last section with page-
view statistics, we can better measure the exposure of dan-
gerous content (i.e., the number of visitors who see it).
To this end, we collected hourly, per-article view statis-
tics [2] for the entirety of 2010. Assuming uniform intra-hour
hit distributions, one can produce a view-estimate for any
incident’s active duration. Fig. 4 shows the CDF of active
view counts (only for incidents active in 2010). The median
case receives ≈ 1.25 views, suggesting that unpopular pages
are frequent targets and/or threatening content on popular
articles is dealt with very quickly. Unsurprisingly, copyright
incidents fared more poorly with a median of 36 views.
Broadly, view statistics can be aggregated to show that
there were roughly 5.9 million views of dangerous revisions
in 2010 (or 11 views per-minute). From this perspective,
Wikipedia seems to be winning the content battle. Given
that the English version served 85 billion pages in 2010 [4],
just 0.007% contained content that has since been redacted.
5.7 Suppression
To this point, our analysis has concentrated on the sim-
ple form of redaction, not the stronger suppression available
only to oversight users. As Tab. 5 shows, this lack of focus
is warranted given that suppression actions occur an order-
of-magnitude less frequently than redaction ones8.
Our brute-force archival and re-querying was successful
in identifying 100+ suppressed edits. Unable to view the
private logs, we cannot establish incident groupings or de-
tection intervals (though they could be lengthy, given the
very small number of oversight users).
However, we can determine the fields that get suppressed.
We find content removal to be most common, followed by
usernames. Summary suppression is exceedingly rare in our
small sample. Finally, manual inspection of revisions shows
that the publication of individual’s addresses and phone
numbers is the most common reason for suppression.
8Suppression counts were obtained from [9]. That source
counts actions, so our presentation of redaction quantity
does the same (i.e., includes “undeletes” and changes).
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we processed one year’s worth of English
Wikipedia’s public deletion logs and used archival strategies
to both recover redacted content and discover privately sup-
pressed revisions. We found that RevDelete was used to
handle nearly 55,000 redactions/suppressions in 2010, most
often hiding content exhibiting the characteristics of libel,
copyright infringement, and privacy violations.
We also found that the tool, only recently being widely
enabled, is being used to eliminate a backlog of old incidents.
Focus on recent incidents indicates a reactive system. For
instance, dangerous content is usually inactive within two
minutes, with formal deletion within two hours. We found
that 0.007% of page views in 2010 resulted in exposure to
threatening content. Many such views were the result of
copyright issues – the most problematic of behaviors studied.
Detecting these copyright issues and preventing danger-
ous content altogether both appear worthwhile areas for re-
search. Such progress could reduce the liability of UGC
hosts and improve perceptions of the collaborative paradigm.
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